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and England in the entire enterprise, as well as their
extensions and colonies in the New World. It also explains the deep impact of Asian goods and people,
especially in Spanish and Portuguese America, where
repeated contact with “the East” was an integral
part of three centuries of history. Indeed, the central role of the Acapulco-Mexico City-Veracruz route,
and the complexity of alternate and often illegal
routes and activities in Spanish-language sources,
might have been given more play in the book. The
book’s specific contribution is not only its attention
to that history, but also its inclusion of North American reception of Asian goods and artistic technologies.
Clara Bargellini
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México
Jonathan Eacott. Selling Empire: India in the Making
of Britain and America, 1600–1830. Published for
the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture, Williamsburg, Virginia. Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina, 2016. 472 pp.;
25 halftones, 7 figures, notes, index. $30.00 (paper).
This is a book about storied empires, the figments
of the imperial imagination—“America the India”
and “India the place”—making and breaking worlds
around them. The book spans centuries, but the
story isn’t linear. It is a story, in fact, of a feedback
loop: a set of memes that travel through sinuous
and mazelike circuits, turning the dreams of empires into nightmares. It wasn’t India, but the idea
of India—“in the grandest policies and close to skin
in the most intimate places” (4)—which drove the
British empire in America to become what it became: a real-life version of the imaginary India that
Britons had envisioned in the seventeenth century.
The grand and intimate vision of India was a sustaining dream of progress; British imperialists kept
reaching for it every time they started to stumble,
and, strangely, it did stabilize them. The book, however, is not a progress narrative so much as a centuryspanning shadow play of America the India and
India the place. The final characters of this epic pantomime are the missionaries who traveled to India
from a cotton-fueled nineteenth-century America—
trafficking as well as embodying Hakluyt’s dream
from centuries ago.
The book begins with the original dream, in
which Britain ruled America as a colony and traded
with an independent India. The dream, as we learn
in chapter 1, produced extravagant schemes to

make the cottons, silks, and spices grow in America
as they did in India. Could Virginia be a “second
India,” asked Thomas Abbay in his dedication to
John Smith’s 1612 Map of Virginia (14)? Readings
of Hakluyt, Purchas, and Middleton set the stage
for the “calico invasion” of the late seventeenth
century. The trading of calicoes in Africa and
America created both a fashion and an empire. It
also made British weavers, threatened by their Indian competitors, riot against “Calico madams.” The
Calico Acts (1700 and 1721) set in place a new dynamic, as Eacott explains in chapter 2. The second
act, which banned the sale as well as import of the
fabric in Britain, allowed the East India Company
to trade it to America. Combined with the company’s American monopoly, the prohibition of calicoes in Britain produced an inflammatory situation, setting off new debates in the colonial moral
economy. It wasn’t just India that was changed by
these debates—in fact, as Eacott goes on to show,
the American Revolution sprang from them.
It is a strange omission of eighteenth-century
historiography that the period between the 1720s
and 1770s is rarely examined as a whole. The third
and fourth chapters of this book incorporate the
events that mark this extremely busy period into
a convincing timeline of a continuous arc of intraimperial legislative deliberations. The Calico Act
was a splendid addition to the imperial state’s regulatory machine. The British lawmakers yanked and
pulled at this chain for decades, tweaking the regulations in response to new pressures, constraints,
and events in the political timeline of empire and
the legislative timeline of the law in the period leading to the Seven Years War. Successful enforcement
was an imperial aesthetic. The justice that was served
had to be displayed as well. As elephant shows were
held in London and banyans banned at Harvard’s
commencement, the English Parliament went to
work writing laws which made the point that colonies were subservient to metropolitan governments.
That by itself wouldn’t be so surprising if it wasn’t
for how “India the place” kept on turning into
“America the India.” From the place of calico in
the Sugar Act of 1764 to the parallels between the
Regulating Act and the Tea Act, both in 1773,
Eacott doesn’t miss a detail. Historians of India,
Britain, and America will have to engage with this
argument deeply, but so will scholars of legal history and the English Parliament in the eighteenth
century.
The implications are truly astonishing. If the
East India Company as monstrous tyrant became
an American revolutionary trope, if the Hastings
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trial was compared to Shay’s rebellion, it wasn’t because India was a distant comparison or locus of
imaginary solidarity: India, it seems, was inside
America. America was made up of stories about
India—maybe not entirely, but at a degree that
hasn’t been realized. The American dream was a
reversal, in its original form, of the British dream
of India. In this inverted ideological structure, finances were also significant. In any case, the crises
of the East India Company worked out really well
for America. For John Brown, the new situation
meant that he could “profit from an empire that
Americans had fought to leave by working with
Britons desirous of profiting off their own Asian
empire” (258).
As for Britain, it’s not as if it suffered. The independence of the United States was excellent news
for British manufacturers. The trade that was lost
by the American Revolution was regained later by
industrialization. The British responded to the loss
of the colonies by emulating Indian cotton with
American raw materials. The rise of America as a
competitive force was accompanied by the resurgence, in the Board of Trade’s London proceedings, of old debates from the 1680s. American independence brought missionaries to India. The
conversion of Indians to Christianity was not unrelated, as Eacott argues in the final chapter, to
the biggest conversion of all: “the conversion of
America into a cotton cultivating power, an India,
not in name, but in the raw material that it provided” (436).
Properly speaking, the book is an epic: four centuries, four continents, comparative, global, and
interimperial. The book derives its power from its
methodological rigor, its interdisciplinary tool kit,
and its firm control over narrative form. All are necessary in order for Eacott to find, as he does, in
pictures of hookahs and palanquins, the transfer
of imperial imaginaries from one continent and
century to another. But the triangulated fate of
continents wouldn’t appear with such clarity if it
wasn’t for Eacott’s unflinching attention to nonevents and strange omissions. “Notably,” he observes,
“Congress did not create a monopoly company and
did not agree to significant incentives for American merchants to obtain India goods from India itself as opposed to from Europe” (275). By comparing what happened to what didn’t, Eacott explains
the ironic reversals that marked the transition from
the eighteenth to the nineteenth centuries. “The
empire’s development,” he observes in the conclusion, “did not always follow the path its schemers
expected, and yet it ultimately fulfilled most of

their big expectations” (443). The British empire
was a miracle of history—except for the fact that
it didn’t exactly make itself.
Selling Empire is a long book, but it has to be read
in order, from start to finish. It is not a book you
can dip into—you have to follow the argument as
it unfolds progressively so that the “system we create
with our ideas” appears in contrast to all the other
historical processes—lawmaking, mythmaking—that
it systematizes (443). The three empires in the title
of this book are spinning worlds inside each detail:
unremarked shifts in the percentage change of
drawbacks to be charged on calico in the Sugar
Act of 1764; the appearance in a simple phrase like
“variety of fashionable and high quality goods” of
the emerging aesthetic of the imperial supply chain;
Spanish overtures to the American revolutionaries,
offering to capture East India ships; and—decades
later—American ships during the Napoleonic wars
carrying silver in and out of India—under the pretense of neutrality. It is through these details that
Selling Empire supplies the reader, in every paragraph
on every page, with a way of thinking between and
across the scales of historical experience. Not one
detail is insignificant.
Farid Azfar
Swarthmore College
Marguerite S. Shaffer and Phoebe S. K. Young,
eds. Rendering Nature: Animals, Bodies, Places, Politics. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
2015. 406 pp.; 54 black-and-white images, notes,
index. $55.00.
Americans often view nature and culture as separate and opposing realms, with nature as a pristine,
timeless sanctuary from the human world. Yet this
belief emerged only recently, in response to environmental transformations of the industrial revolution.
Many scholars have questioned this nature-culture
dichotomy by examining the myriad entanglements
between nature and culture. In particular, they have
explored the ways that cultural constructions of nature shape environmental use. Ironically, through
these studies the nature-culture dichotomy has been
contested but also perpetuated. Nature always has a
material presence—despite cultural constructions
of nature, a material nature still exists, however perceived. However, even the idea of the Anthropocene
as a geological period in which human activities have
become akin to forces of nature assumes the existence of a preindustrial nature unaffected by human
actions.
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